COMMENT
A PROPOSED MODEL OF THE SOVEREIGN/
PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION
TERESA GILLENt

The United States Supreme Court has suggested that governments
that act as "sovereigns" are or should be subject to different constitutional standards than governments that act as "proprietors." ' This sovereign/proprietary distinction has befuddled some commentators 2 and
has been criticized by others;' few authorities off the Court have embraced it," and commentary on the distinction reflects a vague hope that
the Court will abandon it.5 This, however, has not happened.
t B.A. 1977, University of Rochester, M.A. 1981, University of Chicago, J.D.
Candidate, 1985, University of Pennsylvania. The author wrote this Comment while a
student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 The distinction has long existed in the areas of municipal tort liability and sovereign immunity. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 97787 (4th ed. 1971). For other areas in which the distinction may be applicable, see Wells
& Hellerstein, The Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction in Constitutional Law, 66
VA. L. REv. 1073, 1073-74 n.9 (1980). This Comment confines itself to constitutional
law.
2 See, e.g., Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 1, which is the only major commentary on the recent use of the distinction in constitutional law. The authors express
ambivalence about the distinction's merit. See id. at 1136-39.
3 See, e.g., Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1317-24 (1984); Varat, State 'Citizenship'
and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 487, 505-07 (1981); Note, Proprietary
Powers: A New Tool for the States?, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 729 (1977); Note, State
Market Activity Exempt from Commerce Clause Review, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1575,
1599 (1981); see also L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw § 6-10, at 336-38
(1978) (criticizing the distinction raised in Hughes v.. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794 (1976)). Interestingly, Professor Tribe argued the case for the appellants
before the Supreme Court in White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers,
460 U.S. 204 (1983), a case in which the Court relied heavily on Alexandria Scrap.
Sixty years ago the Court itself criticized the distinction as "utterly irrelevant to
the standards imposed under the Constitution." Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182,
191-92 (1923).
4 Only a handful of lower courts have relied upon the distinction. See, e.g., Smith
v. Department of Agriculture, 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
910 (1981); Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 576
F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Wis. 1983), rev'd in part, Nos. 84-1115, 84-2075 (7th Cir. Dec.
18, 1984); Transport Limousine, Inc. v. Port Auth., 571 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
5 See, e.g, Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 1139 ("The governmental-proprietary distinction, however, despite its longevity, does not play such a pervasive role
(661)
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Unfortunately, the Court has never defined the terms sovereign
and proprietor, an omission that suggests the problematic nature of the
Court's distinction. When labeling a governmental entity a proprietor
or "market participant"-a term it treats as synonymous with proprietor-the Court appears to mean that the entity is engaged in buying or
selling a good or service directly to or from the private sector.6 The
Court has applied this label to a local government that contracts with
builders to construct public works;' to a local government that operates
a public bus system;' to a state government that operates a cement
plant and sells cement to the public;9 and to a state government that
pays junk dealers for abandoned car scraps.1 0 The Court recently split
over whether a public school board was a sovereign or nonsovereign,
with a plurality voting for the former. 1
Conversely, when describing a governmental entity as a sovereign,
the Court appears to refer. to a government that is either taxing or
regulating the activity of private parties. 2 For example the Court has
labeled as sovereign a state that required that all produce grown in the
state be packed before shipment1" and a state that required in-state gas
producers to supply domestic needs before piping the surplus to other
4

states.'

Whether a court treats a governmental entity as a proprietor or
sovereign is important, for in certain areas of the law nongovernmental
entities, of which a governmental entity acting as a proprietor would be
one, are subject to different standards than are governmental entities.
In some areas, for instance, governmental entities are immune from liability for actions for which nongovernmental entities are liable. Tort
law, which recognizes the defense of sovereign immunity, is one example. 5 In other areas, however, legal prohibitions are directed specifi[i.e., like the term "ownership"], and, if the case against it were strong enough, a persuasive argument could be made for abandoning it altogether.").
6

Justice Stevens suggested that the state may even create the market itself. See

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 815 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).

' See, e.g., United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S.
Ct. 1020 (1984); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204

(1983).
" See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
' See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
10 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
" See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion). The language was not quite this explicit. See infra text accompanying notes 56-65.
12 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976).
IS See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), cited in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 805 (1976).
14 See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), cited in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976).
"5 W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 131, at 977-87.
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cally at governments and are not applicable to private actors. The commands of the first amendment and the commerce clause are examples of
such prohibitions. The result of these differences is that a court that
labels a governmental entity as a proprietor will often subject that entity's actions to different legal standards than will a court that labels
such an entity as a sovereign.
The distinction reflects the Constitution's concern with outlining
and limiting the powers of government while leaving individual freedom unrestricted. As Professor Stone has stated, "Where an ordinary
mortal is concerned, we can .discern a value in preserving a sphere, free
from state influence, in which he or she may be arbitrary, capricious,
or prejudicial." 6 Governments, the Constitution tells us, ought not to
be arbitrary, capricious, or prejudicial. They do not benefit from the
intrinsic value of the freedom to be capricious. Moreover, governments
have extraordinary powers to coerce individuals and to infringe upon
their liberty. The Constitution attempts to limit these governmental
powers.
One can also view the Constitution as an attempt to limit the relative advantages and capacities of the public and private sectors. It enables the government to intervene in the market when the private sector
might become overwhelming or conflict with the needs of the nation.Y1
However, it also attempts to limit the power of the public sector in
areas where it has special advantages-mostly in noneconomic areas.
If the sovereign/proprietary distinction represents an accurate
view of the functions of governments, it may be a useful analytical tool
in certain types of cases. However, the Court's use of the distinction has
been neither thoughtful nor principled. Rather, the Court has invoked
it sporadically and without any attempt to explain its underlying rationale or to outline any limiting principles.
Proceeding on the assumption that the distinction may be helpful
in certain types of cases, this Comment proposes a model for distinguishing between governments that act as sovereigns and those that act
as proprietors. The first Part reviews the cases in which the Supreme
Court has either embraced or rejected the distinction. Part II discusses
the advantages and disadvantages of the distinction and demonstrates
the Court's unprincipled use of it. Part III proposes a method for distinguishing sovereign governmental activity from proprietary governmental activity. The Part then re-examines the cases discussed in Part I
16

Stone, CorporateVices and CorporateVirtues: Do PubliclPrivateDistinctions

Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1441, 1489 (1982).
17 Examples may be found among the powers granted to Congress by article I of
the Constitution, especially power to regulate interstate commerce.
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in light of the proposed analysis. The Comment concludes that the sovereign/proprietary distinction, if used in a principled way, can be useful in commerce clause cases but warns that its major shortcoming is
that its use is limited to those cases.
I.

THE COURT'S DISTINCTION

The Supreme Court's use of the sovereign/proprietary distinction
has been ad hoc and confusing. 8 The Court has not always invoked the
distinction in cases in which it might have, 9 and, as a result, it is unclear what governmental activity falls under which category. The Court
has used the distinction most consistently in a handful of commerce
clause cases. This makes sense because a characterization of the government's economic function can be helpful when the governmental activity being challenged is economic in nature, as in the commerce clause
cases. Various members of the Court have argued that the distinction
should also be used in non-commerce clause cases; however, reliance on
the distinction is less helpful when noneconomic rights are involved,
and the Court has been less sure in its use of the distinction in that
context.
A.

The Economic Realm: The Commerce Clause

The Supreme Court cases applying the sovereign/proprietary distinction to governmental activity challenged under the commerce clause
have been decided under the "dormant" commerce clause doctrine. According to this doctrine, the Constitution's grant to Congress of power
to regulate interstate commerce implies that a state is not free to act in
a manner that imposes improper burdens on interstate commerce. 20 For
example the dormant commerce clause limits a state's ability to impose
restrictions on trucks traveling on roadways in that state. 2 '
The Supreme Court has held in many cases that state governments
acting as market participants are exempt from the restrictions imposed
by the dormant commerce clause. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap

"eSymptomatic of this is the Court's recent formulation of a "quasi-sovereign"
category. See Snapp, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600-08 (1982).
9 For example the Court has not invoked the distinction in cases dealing with the
need for governmental efficiency in the management of property or the provision of
services. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114 (1981).

See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 6-1 to 6-12, at 319-412.
See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
20
21
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Corp.,2 2 the first of these cases, involved a Maryland program for dealing with the problem of abandoned automobiles. The state offered
scrap processors a bounty for the destruction of any abandoned automobile that had been titled in Maryland. Several years after the program
was established, Maryland, seeking to decrease state expenditures for
the destruction of automobiles abandoned in other states, changed the
program by imposing documentation requirements on non-Maryland
processors more stringent than those applicable to domestic processors."3 The federal district court ruled that the amended program violated the commerce clause and the equal protection rights of out-ofstate processors, 24 and the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court admitted that "the practical effect of the amendment
. . . was that the movement of hulks in interstate commerce was reduced,"2' 5 but it rejected the argument "that every action by a State that
has the effect of reducing in some manner the flow of goods in interstate commerce is potentially an impermissible burden."2 Rather, the
Court stated that the regulation did not even fall within the boundaries
of the commerce clause: "Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow
of hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market itself to bid up their price."' 27 The
traditional commerce clause inquiry was thus not required. "Nothing
in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in
the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market
and exercising the right to favor its own citizens .... ",
Four years later the Court relied on Alexandria Scrap in Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake,2 9 a case in which it held that a South Dakota restriction
on the sale of cement produced by a state-operated cement plant to
nonresidents did not run afoul of the commerce clause. The state had
built the plant in response to regional cement shortages,30 and for over
22

426 U.S. 794 (1976).

21 See id. at 804-05.

" Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46, 58, 63 (D. Md. 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
25 Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 803 (footnote omitted).
26
27

Id. at 805.
Id. at 806.

28 Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted). Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices
Marshall and White, questioned the existence of a state's "right" to favor its own citizens, especially in light of prior commerce clause cases suggesting that such favoritism
was prohibited. See id. at 822-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also asserted that prior
cases upholding restrictive state purchasing statutes had done so only when the state
was purchasing for its own use, in contrast with the case at hand, in which the state
was acting as "one link in the chain of interstate commerce." Id. at 824.
28 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
80 Id. at 430.
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fifty years it had produced cement that was sold to in-state and out-ofstate buyers alike. But by 1978 the plant was no longer able to fill all
the orders it received, leading the State Cement Commission to reaffirm
" 'its policy of supplying all South Dakota customers first and to honor
all contract commitments, with the remaining volume allocated on a
first come, first served basis.' "" The federal district court concluded
that this practice was contrary to the national free market envisioned by
the commerce clause, 2 but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
disagreed and reversed; the Supreme Court upheld the reversal. The
Court stated,
The basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as market participants and States as market
regulators makes good sense and sound law.. . . There is no

indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the
States themselves to operate freely in the free market.
. . .[S]tate proprietary activities may be, and often are,
burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private market participants. Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting
as proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits
of the Commerce Clause. 3
Because the Court found that South Dakota "unquestionably" was a
market participant in this case, it held that the state's activity was exempt from commerce clause scrutiny. 4
The Court relied heavily on Alexandria Scrap and Reeves in
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,35 its most
recent decision involving the commerce clause and the sovereign/proprietary distinction. In White an organization of builders challenged a
Boston ordinance that required that at least one-half of employees of all
3' Id. at 432-33 (quoting Report of State Cement Commission 13 (1920)).
32

See id. at 433.

8 Id. at 436-39 (footnote and citations omitted).
See id. at 440. Justice Powell, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Stevens, argued that the majority had misused the Alexandria Scrap
analysis. The inquiry, he said, was not simply whether the state was entering the market, but whether that activity "constituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting). He asserted that the second part of the
inquiry in Alexandria Scrap had determined that the Maryland prohibition had not
completely halted the flow of car hulks in interstate commerce and that, consequently,
the Maryland program was not barred by the commerce clause. Here, however, the
South Dakota policy completely shut off interstate trade. Id. at 452. Thus, Powell
argued, it violated the commerce clause.
35 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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contractors to whom city construction contracts were awarded be Boston residents. 6
The Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts's decision that the ordinance was unconstitutional,3 7 declaring, "[W]hen a state or local government enters the market as a participant it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause."3 " The
"single inquiry" used by the Court was "'whether the challenged program constituted direct state participation in the market.'-"9 The
Court stated that "[i]f the city is a market participant, then the Commerce Clause establishes no barrier"40 to the ordinance. Concluding
that in this case the city was acting as a proprietor, 41 the Court did not
even enter into an analysis of the constitutionality of the ordinance.' 2
"6See id. at 206.
The Massachusetts court held that the commerce clause prohibited such regulations. See id. at 206 (citing Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers v. Mayor of
Boston, 384 Mass. 466, 425 N.E.2d 346 (1981)). Using standard commerce clause
analysis, it found that the ordinance would have a significant impact on the employment of out-of-state residents and that the preference for state residents was a broadsweeping one not targeted at the legitimate interests asserted by the city. See id. at 208
(citing Massachusetts Council, 384 Mass. at 479, 425 N.E.2d at 354-55).
" White, 460 U.S. at 208.
39 Id. (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980)).
40 Id. at 210.
"I See id. at 215. The Court also stated that "[i]nsofar as the mayor's executive
order was applied to projects funded in part with funds obtained from the federal programs described above, the order was affirmatively sanctioned by the pertinent regulations of those programs." Id.
4"Three of the four Justices who had dissented in Reeves joined the majority in
White, while Justice Blackmun, who wrote the Court's opinion in Reeves, dissented in
White. Justice Blackmun argued that Alexandria Scrap and Reeves had been concerned with "ensuring that the States enjoy 'the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.'" White, 460 U.S. at 217
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39). The Boston ordinance, however, "directly restricts the ability of private employers to hire nonresidents,
and thereby curtail nonresidents' access to jobs with private employers." Id. This type
of preference "[is] not immune. . . solely because the city has imposed [it] as [a] condition[] to its contracts with private employers." Id.
Justice Blackmun proposed a modified purpose analysis, based upon the principles
of Reeves, for distinguishing between a state acting as a sovereign and one acting as a
proprietor. Applying this analysis to the cases, he argued that Reeves and Alexandria
Scrap "were relatively pure examples of a seller's or purchaser's simply choosing its
bargaining partners," whereas White was a case of "a direct attempt to govern private
economic relationships." Id. at 218-19. Unfortunately, although his perception of a
need to establish limits upon the applicability of the sovereign/proprietary distinction
was accurate, Justice Blackmun's attempt to provide such a limit is not very helpful.
His focus on whether the action "more closely resembles an attempt to impede trade
among private parties," id. at 218, does not indicate whether he is more concerned with
the state's purpose or with the effect of the state's action. The latter seems to be his true
concern when he warns that the effect of a requirement limiting trade with out-ofstaters "would be virtually identical" to a market regulation. See id. at 220.
A more serious problem, however, is that this inquiry does not seem to distinguish
37
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Noneconomic Cases

1. Procedural Due Process
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy43 was the
first case in which the Supreme Court used the sovereign/proprietary
distinction. In McElroy an employee of a cafeteria at a federal government weapons plant was dismissed without a hearing because she failed
to satisfy certain security requirements. The Court held that the failure
to provide a hearing did not violate the due process clause for two reasons: the employee's interest in the job was not sufficiently important
and the government's proprietary military capacity gave it unfettered
control.44 The Court noted, "[Tihe governmental function operating
here was not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker, an entire
trade or profession, or to control an entire branch of private business,
White from the other cases. Justice Blackmun argued that the legislative schemes attacked in Alexandria Scrap and Reeves were attempts by states to choose their bargaining partners, yet the Boston ordinance at issue in White was arguably a similar
effort. Although Justice Blackmun perceived the ordinance as an attempt by Boston to
control the hiring policies of private employers, it really was a decision by the city to
refuse to deal with firms composed of non-Bostonians. Justice Blackmun's dissent thus
fails to provide a satisfactory limitation on the scope of the sovereign/proprietary
distinction.
An interesting aspect of Justice Blackmun's dissent is his avoidance of the antitrust
issue. He noted that efforts by governments to dictate to a private party with whom she
may deal is the "essence of regulation," however, such efforts by private parties, although "viewed with suspicion and closely limited," are not absolutely prohibited. See
id. at 218. In a footnote he cited several cases in which attempts to induce trading
partners not to deal with other persons were held to violate the antitrust laws. See id. at
219-20 n.4. If one wanted to discourage state and local governments from doing the
same thing, the obvious approach would be to bring an antitrust suit against them.
However, the state action is immune from federal antitrust law. See Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
The rationale for this immunity is that the commerce clause was not intended
to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign

. .

. , an unexpressed purpose to nullify a

state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.
Id. at 350-51.
Parkerhas been widely criticized. See Handler, The CurrentAttack on the Parker
v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 n.3, 3 n.8 (1976). Recently, a
federal district court held that when the state is acting as a proprietor, it should not be
immune from antitrust suits under the state action exemption. See Limeco, Inc. v. Division of Lime, 546 F. Supp. 868 (N.D. Miss. 1982). This exception was also suggested
in Note, The Presumption Alternative to Municipal Antitrust Liability, 51 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 145, 166 (1982). This approach supplies some badly needed consistency to the sovereign/proprietary distinction, and it is unfortunate that Justice Blackmun did not include it in his dissent in White.
43 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
44 See id. at 895-96.
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but, rather, as proprietor, to manage the internal operation of an important federal military establishment." 4
The Court seems to have used the proprietor language here as a
descriptive tool in its analysis of the government's interest. The Court
did not hold that the government's function or interest -was equivalent
to that of a private proprietor, although the language is somewhat unclear on this point. The Court first stated that "[ilt has become a settled
principle that government employment, in the absence of legislation,
can be revoked at the will of the appointing officer,"4' 6 but it then went
on to argue that "state and federal governments, even in the exercise of
their internal operations, do not constitutionally have the complete free47
dom of action enjoyed by a private employer.1

Although the Court has continued to use a functional approach
when considering procedural due process claims, it has not invoked McElroy's proprietor language in cases in which the government is the
employer.4"
2.

The First Amendment

Although no majority opinion of the Court has ever relied on the
sovereign/proprietary distinction in a first amendment case, plurality,
concurring, and dissenting opinions have occasionally advocated its use
in this context. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights4" and Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico5" provide two examples.
In Shaker Heights the Court upheld an agreement between a city
and an advertising company that prohibited political advertising on city
transportation vehicles. A plurality of four justices5 rejected the argument that advertising space in a bus is a public forum and held that, in
providing transportation, the city was engaged in a "commercial venture" and was acting in a "proprietary capacity" when it banned the
advertisements.

52

In much the same way that a newspaper or periodical, or
Id. at 896 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 897-98. For example the Court stated that a state would not have been
free to dismiss an employee for reasons that were "patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 898.
48 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
49 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
50 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
5' Justices Blackmun, White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger formed the
plurality.
52 See Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 303-04 (plurality opinion).
45
41
41
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even a radio or television station, need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public, a city transit system has discretion to develop and make reasonable choices
concerning the type of advertising that may be displayed on
its vehicles.

53

The plurality stated that this was a "managerial decision" not unlike
decisions about fares or the location of bus stops and, thus, that the
54
advertising ban did not violate the first amendment.
The plurality then utilized the sovereign/proprietary distinction to
permit the city to restrict political expression much as a private bus
company could: "[T]he city is engaged in commerce. It must provide a
rapid, convenient, pleasant and inexpensive service to the commuters of
Shaker Heights.1

55

In Pico the Court divided on the issue whether a school board's
removal of books from a public library violated the first amendment.
The case produced seven opinions, with a judgment that the case be
remanded to the district court for further factual findings. A plurality
57
of three Justices, 56 balancing the students' right to receive information
against the school board's need to determine the content of books for
educational purposes, 58 concluded that if the decisive factor in the
school board's decision was an intent to deny the students access to
ideas with which the school board disagreed, then the removal would
violate the students' first amendment rights.59 Two Justices concurred
on separate grounds. 0
53 Id. at 303.
See id. at 304. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion, emphasizing the constitutional rights of commuters who have no choice but to sit and look at the
messages. Douglas relied on his dissent in Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.

451, 469 (1952), arguing that in both Pollak and Shaker Heights "the viewer or listener is captive." Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
55 Id. at 303.
56 The plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.

5 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 866-69 (plurality opinion).
58 See id. at 869.
51 See id. at 871.
'0 Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion concurring in the need for further
factual findings. He rejected the plurality's argument that students have a right to receive information in a public library, see id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment), and concluded that "school officials may not remove books for the purpose of
restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when
that action is motivated simply by the officials' disapproval of the ideas involved," id. at
879-80.
Justice White concurred in the need for further factfinding, but did so on the
narrow grounds that the district court had granted summary judgment despite the existence of a material issue of fact. Justice White argued that the Court should not have
addressed the difficult first amendment issues raised by the removal of books so long as

1985)

SOVEREIGNIPROPRIETARY DISTINCTION

The four Justices who dissented in Pico invoked the sovereign/
proprietary distinction to argue that the school board did not violate the
first amendment. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Powell, argued that the first amendment imposed less rigid
constraints on government when it acts in a nonsovereign capacity than
when it acts in a sovereign one:6" "[E]xpressive conduct which may not
be prohibited by the State as sovereign may be proscribed by the State
as property owner;" 62 "actions by the government as educator do not
raise the same First Amendment concerns as actions by the government
as sovereign." 3 Categorizing the school board's actions as proprietary,
Rehnquist concluded that there was no constitutional violation. 4 Justice O'Connor, in a separate dissenting opinion, found Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the government's "special role as educator" to be
persuasive.6
In two other first amendment cases, Healy v. James6" and Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,67 Justice Rehnquist was the only
Justice to favor application of the sovereign/proprietary distinction. In
Healy, decided during Justice Rehnquist's first Term on the Court, the
Court held that a state college's refusal to recognize a campus group
violated the first amendment unless it could be shown that the group
had refused to comply with campus regulations.6 8 Justice Rehnquist
concurred and stated, "I find the implication clear from the Court's
opinion that the constitutional limitations on the government's acting as
an administrator of a college differ from the limitations on the government's acting as a sovereign to enforce its criminal laws."' 9 He thus
outlined what would become a favorite theme, adding that it was
equally clear that the government in its capacity as employer
also differs constitutionally from the government in its capacity as the sovereign executing criminal laws.
• . . The government as employer or school administrator may impose upon employees and students reasonable regthe reasons for the removal were not elucidated by the factual record. See id. at 883
(White, J., concurring in judgment).
1 See id. at 908 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62
63

"
65
66
67
65

69

Id.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
420 U.S. 546 (1975).
See Healy, 408 U.S. at 185-94.
Id. at 201 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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ulations that would be impermissible if imposed by the government upon all citizens.1 0
In the following Term, the Court held in Southeastern Promotions that a municipal auditorium's refusal to permit a performance of
the musical "Hair" violated the first amendment. 1 The majority reasoned that a municipal auditorium was a public forum and, therefore,
that the denial, which was based on the content of the intended performance, was an unconstitutional prior restraint. 2 In a solo dissenting
opinion Justice Rehnquist charged that the Court was ignoring the fact
that the government was acting as a manager of property and "not
prohibiting or penalizing the expression of views in dramatic form by
citizens at large."7 " As for the standard of review that should be applied to the auditorium's action, he said,
A municipal theater may not be run by municipal authorities as if it were a private theater, free to judge on a content
basis alone . . . . But, just as surely, that element of it which
is 'theater' ought to be accorded some constitutional recognition along with that element of it which is 'municipal.'7 4
As the above cases suggest, Justice Rehnquist has been the most
ardent proponent of incorporating the sovereign/proprietary distinction
into first amendment doctrine. This advocacy has continued off the
bench, where he has discussed the difficulty of applying a single theory
or philosophy of the first amendment to cases in which the governmental role is not that of a sovereign but rather that of a proprietor or
employer.
In a 1976 address at Gonzaga Law School, Justice Rehnquist
pointed to a case decided that year, Greer v. Spock, 75 as illustrative of
the Court's recognition of the sovereign/proprietary distinction in first
amendment cases." The majority in Greer approved military regulations that forbade political speeches and demonstrations at a military
base on the grounds that the base's special purpose was to train soldiers
and not to serve as a public forum." Justice Rehnquist, in his address,
70 Id. at 202-03 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Thus one distinction appears to be the number of people affected by the government's action.
71 Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 552.
72 Id.
73 Id.
at 571 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74

Id. at 574-75.

424 U.S. 828 (1976).
Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12
GONz. L. REv. 1, 10 (1976).
77 See Greer, 424 U.S. at 837-38. The Court also held that a regulation that
75

76
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argued that "[wlhatever other significance this case may have, it surely
stands for the proposition that the government may regulate speech on
its own property in ways which it could not do if the regulated speech
were on private property."7 8
Justice Rehnquist also argued in the address that the Court had
endorsed the distinction in cases in which the government was an employer. As an example, he cited Arnett v. Kennedy,7 9 a case in which a
divided Court held that the federal government's dismissal of an employee without a pretermination evidentiary hearing did not violate the
employee's procedural due process rights when the employee had in
reckless disregard of the truth claimed that his supervisor had attempted to bribe a community leader.8 Moreover, the Court held that
a statute that permits firing a federal employee for such "cause as will
promote the efficiency" of a governmental agency is not so overbroad or
vague as to improperly chill the exercise of first amendment rights. 1
Interpreting this decision, Justice Rehnquist noted in his lecture,
Thus, again we see that the Court has treated differently the
government as sovereign and lawgiver from the way it treats
the government as an employer. .

.

. After all, if one of the

principal reasons for having freedom of expression is the desirability of the electorate being fully informed in order to
democratically decide on how it shall be governed, some latitude must be given to the duly elected representatives of that
electorate in the implementation of the policies they have
chosen . . .and it would seem scarcely open to doubt that

the policy will be best effectuated by those who do not make
unfounded charges about their boss's official conduct.82
permitted the base commander to prohibit distribution of literature that he thought
constituted "'a clear danger to [military] loyalty, discipline or morale,'" id. at 840
(quoting Department of the Army letter, Guidance on Dissent (June 23, 1969)), did
not violate the first amendment, see id. at 838-40.
8 Rehnquist, supra note 76, at 11.
79

416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion).

80 Id. at 163-64.
"I Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, joined by two other Justices, held that
the statutory provision authorizing the firing of an employee for cause was not so vague
or overbroad as to violate the first amendment. See id. at 158-64 (plurality opinion).
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, joined by one other justice, agreed with the plurality that the provision was "neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad." Id. at 164
(Powell, J., concurring).

' Rehnquist, supra note 76, at 12.
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Privileges and Immunities Clause

Last Term, the Supreme Court refused to adopt the sovereign/
proprietary distinction in a privileges and immunities clause case. At
issue in United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor
of Camden8 was a Camden, New Jersey ordinance that closely resembled the Boston ordinance approved in White-it required that at least
forty percent of the employees of contractors working on Camden construction projects be residents of the city. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey declined to apply the privileges and immunities clause because
the ordinance was not a state regulation. 4 After that decision, the
United States Supreme Court decided White, and the appellees in
United Building argued that White controlled, claiming that the
union's privileges and immunities clause argument was "an Interstate
Commerce Clause argument disguised as a Privileges and Immunities
argument." 5
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, rejected
this argument, however, noting,
The two Clauses have different aims and set different standards for state conduct.
The Commerce Clause acts as an implied restraint
upon state regulatory powers. . . . When the state acts solely
as a market participant, no conflict between state regulation
and federal regulatory authority can arise. The Privileges
and Immunities Clause, on the other hand, imposes a direct
restraint on state action in the interests of interstate harmony. This concern with comity cuts across the market regulator-market participant distinction that is crucial under the
Commerce Clause. It is discrimination against out-of-state
residents on matters of fundamental concern which triggers
86
the Clause, not regulation affecting interstate commerce.
The Court thus refused to transplant the sovereign/proprietary
distinction to privileges and immunities doctrine.8 7 The Court's rationale-that the privileges and immunities clause, for noneconomic reasons, directly restrains state activity-would also bar recognition of the
104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
" Id. at 1023.
85 Brief for Appellees at 20, United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
8"United Bldg., 104 S. Ct. at 1028 (citations omitted).
17 Whether the Court will apply a special privileges and immunities clause analysis in relevant cases involving nonsovereign governmental activities remains to be seen.
83
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distinction in cases involving other constitutional provisions that so restrain state action, provisions such as the first amendment and the due
process clause.

II.

EVALUATING THE COURT'S DISTINCTION

The governmental activity challenged in many of the cases just discussed differs from the traditional regulatory-type governmental activities with which the Court has historically been concerned. Governments
today are engaged in very different types of activities than they were
when the Framers drafted the commerce clause and the first amendment.88 For example, until about 1950 wages and salaries constituted
the largest item in the United States government's budget.8 " Since then,
however, contract disbursements have been larger. 90 Professor Lindblom suggests that this change "marks a shift from government reliance
on authority or administrative direction (over its own employees) to
market direction through purchases of final products from enterprises."9 1 The government has become a more direct participant in
nonlabor and labor markets.
Governments have also recently begun to participate in revenueraising activities, such as the issuing of bonds. Although governments
have long relied on user fees-stamps, for example-to generate revenue, their entry into the bond market is notable because it puts them in
direct competition with private revenue-raising entities.92
The proliferation of public authorities93 in the past fifty years is
another example of the government's changing role in the private
88 Professor Varat notes that there is "no indication that [the Framers] thought
about state proprietary policy at all." Varat, supra note 3, at 505. However, he asks
why traditional commerce clause analysis cannot be used to analyze state proprietary
activities since in other areas the extent of the commerce clause power has changed
dramatically since the Constitution was first adopted. The answer is that the emergence
of state proprietary activities does not simply indicate a change in the extent of power
under the commerce clause but rather signals government involvement in an entirely
different type of activity, uncontemplated by the Framers, so that state proprietary activities actually conflict with the goals of the commerce clause or the balance of powers
established by the Constitution.
88 C. LINDBLOOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 111 (1977).
90 Id.

Id. (citation omitted).
Stone, supra note 16, at 1446. Whether governments should engage in such
activities is a different question. An argument can certainly be made for allowing voters
to prefer such activities to higher taxes.
" Public authorities are semi-autonomous.government bodies that raise capital
from the capital markets to invest in public facilities and services. "They are owned by
the government that so establishes them, but they are hybrid creatures, possessing some
of the characteristics of private firms and some of public agencies." A. WALSH, THE
PUBLIc'S BUSINESS 4 (1978).
91
92
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arena. One observer noted,
American government is in business in a big way
. In
the United States, for the most part, government enterprise
involves public ownership without public policy.
Since the births of the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey in 1921 and the Tennessee Valley Authority in
1933, the most common form of government enterprise has
been the public authority. .

.

. They are one of the few

popularly acceptable forms for American government to engage in economic activities. 9"
The relationship between the public and private sectors has
changed in another way: private entities have entered markets that have
been the traditional realm of government alone, such as postal service,
hospital care, and education. For example, the first hospitals in the
United States were public hospitals that were established as little more
than almshouses for the care of persons who had nowhere else to go.
Today, nonpublic hospitals provide most hospital care.9 5 Thus the nature of the market has changed completely. 6 Similar changes may be
97
occurring in the mail delivery and education markets.
These changes in the relationship between the government and the
private sector may have spurred the Court's development of the sovereign/proprietary distinction.9 8 However, though constitutional doctrine
must evolve to reflect contemporary developments, the Court's application of the sovereign/proprietary distinction has been flawed.
The principal problem has been that, whereas the Court has
clearly identified the two categories of governmental activity-sovereign
and proprietary-to be distinguished, it has failed to elucidate a princiId. at 3.
11 See Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural
Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 249 n.16 (1978).
96 Indeed, the federal government encouraged the building of private hospitals. See
Rosenblatt, supra note 95, at 264-76. The establishment of a voucher system in health
care-i.e., Medicaid-also encouraged private hospitals and physicians to provide
health care to the poor.
94

"

Cf I. DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 75-79 (1983) (stating that

in the American colonies, until the 1820's, "the post office was run with an eye to
making money for the government" but noting that services such as rural delivery-introduced to effect social goals-were later introduced at the expense of profit).
" Judge Friendly's comment made in the state action context may be equally
applicable here: "Particularly in these days when the state's activities embrace not only
the fields traditional when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted but higher education, health, transportation, power production, housing and many others, a principle
that all Fourteenth Amendment guarantees apply to all institutions serving 'public purposes' is much too expansive." H.

FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND

THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA 24

(1968).
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pled method by which courts may determine what governmental activity falls under which category. 99 Without such a method judges may
simply choose a particular label in order to reach a desired result.
A second problem is that the Court has failed to articulate any
limits on the scope of the distinction's applicability; indiscriminate resort to the distinction could undermine important rights developed by
two centuries of constitutional jurisprudence. Justice Rehnquist's advocacy of adoption of the sovereign/proprietary distinction in the first
amendment context is illustrative of this concern.'0 0
III.

THE MODEL

A.

Assumptions

Since the sovereign/proprietary language implies that economic
factors distinguish different governmental activities, it is helpful to look
to economics for guidance in distinguishing activities in which governments act as sovereigns from those in which they act as proprietors.
The starting point of the liberal political economy is the premise that
our society and legal system are based upon a mixed market economy.
This means that our laws assume that individuals freely and rationally
engage in economic activity in the pursuit of maximizing profit or personal utility and, indeed, ought to be encouraged to do so. Economic
theories of the state assume that the state aims to maximize society's
economic welfare. Market failures may result in a situation in which
the price of a good does not reveal the true total of individual preferences-also known as "demand." When this happens, the government
must correct the market failures in order to allow the market to

" Professor Varat has suggested that lower court judges "may strain to choose the
desired label and reach controversial results." Varat, supra note 3, at 507 n.84.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently refused to label as proprietary an Illinois preference law that required all state public works contractors to employ only Illinois laborers. The court therefore scrutinized the law under standard commerce clause analysis and held it to be unconstitutional. See W.C.M. Window Co. v.
Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 494-96 (7th Cir. 1984). Writing for the majority, Judge Posner stated that, had the state limited the preference to projects financed or administered
by the state, its action would have been proprietary-and constitutional. See id. at 495.
However, Posner had some trouble distinguishing Supreme Court cases that had upheld state regulations that were arguably as broad as the Illinois law. See id. (discussing American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (D. 'Fla.) (concluding that
state statute that required all public printing be done within the state violated the commerce clause), affd mem. 409 U.S. 904 (1972)).
100 Another problem with recognition of the distinction in constitutional law is
that there results a doctrinal inconsistency with antitrust law, where the distinction has
not been used by the Court. See supra note 42. Justice Blackmun's assertion of "evenhandedness" as a rationale for the distinction in commerce clause cases applies equally
well here. The Court's current doctrine allows states to have it both ways.
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work.1 o'
The government's role is thus limited to correcting market failures
by providing goods and facilitating trades." 2 In this role the government facilitates cooperation among private economic actors; by requiring cooperation, it can provide goods that would not otherwise be provided or allow individuals to engage in activities in which they would
otherwise not engage.
Therefore the government has a legitimate role in our free market
system-to correct market failures. The three classic types of market
failures requiing governmental intervention are public goods, externalities, and natural monopolies.
Public goods are goods that must be provided to everyone and
from which everyone benefits.' 03 One person's enjoyment of the good
does not decrease another person's enjoyment. No single individual has
an incentive to provide the good because once it has been paid for everyone can use it without paying. Thus each person's incentive is to
wait for someone else to provide the good. Examples of public goods
are national defense and fire and police protection.'0 Since individuals
acting on their own will not provide public goods, the goods can be
supplied only by forcing people to provide the goods collectively.
Externalities are the benefits or harms of an economic activity that
accrue to individuals not engaged in the activity.'0 5 Pollution is the
classic example. Again, the problem is the absence of an incentive for
any individual to reveal her preferences, for if others will bear the cost
of the externality, that individual can benefit without paying. As a result, the true cost of the good that imposes the externality will not be
paid, unless people organize to develop a solution, for example, by
charging fees, paying for the externalities from everyone's money, or
enlarging the jurisdiction to include the areas where the harm or benefit occurs.' However, it is costly for individuals to obtain the informaBURKHEAD & J. MINER, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 97 (1971).
Some economists argue that redistribution of wealth is also a proper role of
government in a liberal political economy. See, e.g., R. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A
NORMATIVE THEORY 8-9 (1981). The controversial issues of when and to what extent
governments should redistribute wealth are beyond the scope of this Comment.
los J. BURKHEAD & J. MINER, supra note 101, at 27-32; M. OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14-15, 35 (1965); Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditures, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
104 Public education, especially at the elementary and secondary school levels, is a
public good in the sense that everyone in society benefits from an educated populace.
However, the benefits to the public differ greatly from those that accrue to the individuals being educated, so public education looks more like an externality. See J. BURKHEAD & J. MINER, supra note 101, at 33.
101Id. at 105.
108 E. MILLS, URBAN ECONoMIcs 235 (1972).
101

102
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tion needed to do this and to communicate their preferences with accuracy. These are "transactions costs." When transactions costs are high,
the market ceases to function efficiently and nonmarket solutions may
be needed to reduce welfare loss.' Thus, this is another classic sovereign function of government.
Natural monopolies exist when the average cost of a good decreases substantially as the quantity of goods increases; for example, as
when the production of a good requires a large fixed cost to make the
good initially available but only small additional costs to produce increased quantities of the good.'
Examples of natural monopolies
might be sewage collection and treatment, rail transportation, and telephone service. A natural monopoly will result in a single firm that
prices the good above marginal cost (the price of the good when the
market is working efficiently) and produces goods in sub-optimal quantities. Government regulation could lower prices to marginal costs and
force the firm to produce the optimal quantity. Again, governments are
good mechanisms for bringing people together and forcing this
cooperation.'"
Whenever governmental activity involves public goods, externalities, or natural monopolies, it most likely is acting to correct a market
failure. However, there are circumstances in which this may not be
true. As discussed, nongovernmental entities have entered fields that
historically have been occupied exclusively by governmental actors. The
entrance of private parties suggests that a market failure that might
once have required the governmental activity no longer exists; when
this occurs, no genuine market failure exists.
B.. Outlining the Model
This Comment argues that governments that act as sovereigns exhibit two characteristics. First, in this role they address market failures;
governments as sovereigns serve as conduits or organizing mechanisms
through which individuals obtain a good or engage in a transaction.
This is the common function of elected bodies, such as legislatures and
town councils.
The second characteristic of sovereign governmental action is that
it is coercive. The Supreme Court has sometimes described coercive ac117

J. BURKHEAD & J. MINER, supra note 101, at 106-07.

8 P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcS 484 (9th ed. 1973).
109 This does not mean that governments have to provide the good. After it extracts the up-front fee, the government may turn the provision of the good over to a
private party that may provide the good, as it does with many public utilities and water
systems.
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'

This is correct

tivity as that which affects the "citizenry in general."

in the sense that if everyone within the jurisdiction of the governmental
entity must comply with the regulation or engage in the transaction the
governmental action is coercive. Conversely, if individuals have a genuine choice about whether to engage in the governmental transaction, the
government is not acting coercively.
The most coercive governmental activities are those in which citizens must participate and to which no alternative is available. Taxation, zoning, and operation of the criminal justice system are examples.111 Less coercive governmental activities are ones to which
nongovernmental alternatives are available. Examples include public
education and public health systems, as the state requires all citizens to
attend school and be vaccinated, and, although the government will
provide education and health care, private actors also supply these services to those who prefer and can afford them.
This Comment proposes that courts treat governmental entities as
sovereigns only if they are acting to correct a market failure and are
doing so coercively. If either of these conditions is not met, the government should be deemed to be acting as a proprietor.
According to this approach, the most sovereign governmental activity is taxation. When taxing, the government serves as a conduit, and it
acts coercively. The tax system assures citizen cooperation and participation in an activity in which no individual would have an incentive to
engage in alone.
At the other end of the continuum would be state lotteries, which
are intended only to raise money for the government. Here, the government is not correcting any market failure but is selling goods directly to
buyers for a fee. Whether it is being coercive is less clear. Individuals
are arguably free to buy a ticket or not, yet the government may have a
monopoly over lottery tickets, a factor that implies coercion. 1 2 Still, the
citizen in the lottery ticket market is considerably freer than the citizen
in the tax or public education market. Thus, when the government operates a lottery, it is probably not acting as a sovereign. 1 '
See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
1 The only way not to participate would be to avoid all connection with the
government. For example, one could avoid participation in the income tax system by
avoiding work and other income-producing activity and divesting oneself of assets that
produce income. Likewise, one could avoid property taxes by not owning property.
1"2 The difficult problem of defining the market is raised when the government
enjoys a monopoly on lotteries in the state. For example if the market is defined as the
lottery market (as opposed to, say, the entertainment market), then people who want to
buy lottery tickets have to either buy them from the government or forego lottery tickets
altogether. This problem of market definition is a common one in antitrust law.
118 Just as the private entrepreneur is judged by the purpose and character of her
110
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Most governmental activities fall somewhere between these two
extremes. Courts using the analysis this Comment proposes will be
able, in a principled way, to determine whether the government in a
particular case is acting as a sovereign or as a proprietor. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's efforts at such determinations have often
been misdirected, as the following discussion reveals.

C. Applying the Model
1. Commerce Clause Cases
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., " Maryland acted as a
sovereign. First, it created the bounty scheme in order to remove an
externality (abandoned cars) and to protect the state's environment and
was thus was correcting a market failure. And by creating the market
and, as a monopolist, barring voluntary schemes for the removal of
abandoned cars, the stated acted coercively. The actual effect of the
scheme was to create a government subsidy program,"' with a smaller
amount paid for out-of-state goods. Because the state was addressing a
market failure and because it was doing so coercively, it, according to
the analysis proposed by this Comment, acted as a sovereign, and, contrary to the Court's holding,""' its action should have been scrutinized
under traditional commerce clause analysis.
The status of the state whose action was challenged in Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake" 7 is more difficult to determine. The initial decision to build
and operate the cement plant came in response to a cement shortage
and was a "product of th6 State's then-prevailing Progressive political
movement." ' The state's action thus appears to have been directed at
a market failure. Nonetheless, the cement market may have changed in
the fifty years during which the state operated the plant so that no
failure existed at the time the suit was brought; by that time the state
may have been operating the plant solely because of its profitability.
enterprise regardless of the final disposition of the profits, so the government's economic
activity ought to be judged without regard to the ultimate expenditure of the revenues.
.1

426 U.S. 794 (1976).

Accord Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 n.14 (1980). Thus Maryland's program looks more like a subsidy of state residents than a tax on nonresidents.
The latter appears to be impermissible if its effect is to create an economic barrier to
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349
"'

(1951).
I'l In Alexandria Scrap the Court held that Maryland's scrap bonus arrangement was a proprietary governmental activity and was thus exempt from commerce
clause analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
117

447 U.S. 429 (1980).

118 Id.

at 430.
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Although it appears that the state was not a monopolist in the
cement market,' 1 9 the record does not make clear whether the state's
power was still coercive. Thus, if the government was acting in response to a market failure rather than, for instance, to make money and
if it was acting as a coercive entity in the market, the exclusion of outof-state buyers should have been analyzed under traditional commerce
clause analysis. Once again, this analysis suggests a result contrary to
that reached by the Court.' 2"
Finally, the city of Boston in White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employers, 2 ' was acting as a proprietor because it was
not regulating or monopolizing the Boston building construction market
and thus was exercising only limited coercive power. And the government was not acting as a conduit for cooperation but as an employer of
labor. Thus the analysis proposed here supports the Court's conclusion
that the Boston ordinance should be exempt from standard commerce
clause analysis.
2.

Non-Commerce Clause Cases

Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School DistrictNo.
26 v. Pico,'22 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,'2" and United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden 12 4 all reveal an important limitation inherent in the sovereign/proprietary distinction: it is not a useful tool for assessing the role of government in
noneconomic contexts. In neither Pico nor Shaker Heights was there a
majority opinion adopting the distinction in first amendment doctrine,
and a majority of the Court rejected extension of the distinction to privileges and immunities doctrine in United Building.
Shaker Heights illustrates nicely the problem that arises when the
distinction is applied unthinkingly in a noneconomic context. When the
Court said that the city bus was more like a newspaper than a park,
surely it did not mean that what is acceptable behavior for Rupert
Murdoch is equally acceptable for the city of Shaker Heights. The latter ought to be held to a higher level of constitutional behavior, for
when the government acts, it puts its "seal of approval" on a certain
See id. at 432.
In Reeves the Court held that the state's cement production was a proprietary
activity and thus that the state's preferential treatment of in-state cement customers was
exempt from traditional commerce clause analysis. See supra text accompanying notes
29-34129 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
122 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
123 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
124 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
119
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type of behavior, an important effect not considered in a sovereign/
proprietary discourse.
Or consider state operation of a lottery. Suppose that the state, to
generate revenue, permits advertisements on the back of lottery tickets
and that the Republican state administration refuses to sell space to
businesses owned by Democrats. If the courts treated the state that operated such a lottery as a proprietor, the state would not be subject to
first amendment scrutiny, and it would thus be free to discriminate. Yet
allowing such behavior by the government would be terribly wrong, for
the state has, in effect, sanctioned two-class citizenship and has raised
the first amendment rights of one group above those of another. It is
clear that the Court would hold that such action violated the first
amendment. Even Justice Rehnquist concedes this.125
These examples illustrate the problems that arise when the sovereign/proprietary distinction is applied in non-commerce clause cases.
Because the distinction is rooted in the differing economic consequences
attributable to different governmental activities, it ignores the
noneconomic effects of governmental behavior, effects that are central to
many areas of constitutional analysis, such as the first amendment. The
commerce clause, in contrast, is primarily concerned with the economic
impact of governmental action on interstate commerce and the national
economic unit.12 6 The sovereign/proprietary distinction is therefore
most useful in commerce clause cases.
The Court's recent decision in United Building indicates that it
recognizes this limit. In refusing to invoke the distinction there, the
Court argued that, unlike the commerce clause, the privileges and immunities clause's "concern with comity cuts across the market regulator-market participant distinction that is crucial under the Commerce
Clause. It is discrimination

.

. .

which triggers the Clause, not regula-

tion affecting interstate commerce. "127 The same thing, of course, can
be said of the first amendment.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's reliance on the sovereign/proprietary distinction may be a legitimate attempt to respond to the changing functions of government. Over the past 200 years governments have, in
many ways, evolved from lawmaker-regulators to suppliers of goods
See Pico, 457 U.S. at 907-08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 113 (10th ed. 1975); J. NOWACK, R.
ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144-46 (2d ed. 1983).
127 United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1028.
125
128
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and services, a change that often has brought them into direct competition with the private sector. To the extent the distinction accurately
reflects this change, it can be a useful tool. However, the Court's use of
the distinction has been ad hoc and unprincipled, and, consequently,
certain governmental activities have escaped commerce clause analysis
that courts should have applied to them. Furthermore, the use of the
distinction in areas such as the first amendment may be undesirable
because it focuses the Court's attention on the coercive effect of the
government in the economic market but ignores the special imprimatur
that is put on all governmental activities.
This Comment proposes a principled method for distinguishing
governments that act as sovereigns from those that act as proprietors: if
a government acts as a collective mechanism to correct a market failure
and does so coercively, it acts as a sovereign; otherwise, it acts as a
proprietor. Use of this test will make more meaningful the application
of the sovereign/proprietary distinction in commerce clause cases and
will provide more guidance to lower courts and governments than does
the Court's current approach. Yet it must be recognized that the distinction is not helpful for assessing the constitutionality of governmental
action in non-commerce clause contexts, for it fails to take into account
important noneconomic effects of governmental action. It should thus
not be used in non-commerce clause cases.

